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Mathilde BRÉMOND, Lectures de Mélissos. Édition, traduction et interprétation des témoignages
sur Mélissos de Samos, Berlin/Boston, Walter De Gruyter, 2019 (Studia Praesocratica), 595
p., ISBN : 978-3-11-054288-2.
1 Melissus of Samos has long been due an uptick in scholarly attention. His plainly worded,
workmanlike Ionic prose offers a welcome contrast to Parmenides’ Epic—and often deeply
obscure—hexameters.  Melissus,  too,  seems  to  have  come  to  be  something  of  a
representative  for  Eleatic  thought  in  antiquity  and makes  intriguing  appearances  in
Plato’s Theaetetus and, particularly, in Aristotle’s dialectical accounts of his predecessors
that have never quite received satisfactory treatment. 
2 Happily, there has been a recent and very welcome increase in scholarly interest in the
Eleatic  marked  by  the  publication  of  Jaap  Mansfeld’s  lectures  from  Eleatica 2012,
Brémond’s  contribution under  review,  and  my  own reconstruction  of  the  fragments
published last year (Melissus and Eleatic Monism, Cambridge University Press). What ties
these volumes together is an insistence upon the historical and philosophical interest of
Melissus himself,  formed independently of any primary consideration of his value for
solving the very many, and very well-studied, interpretative puzzles in Parmenides. This
is all to the good. 
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3 Brémond’s study is a particularly welcome contribution. The volume does not approach
Melissus’ surviving fragments directly but offers a comprehensive survey of his reception
from Aristotle to Simplicius, including his important discussion in the mysterious treatise
known as  the  MXG that  survives  in  the  Aristotelian  manuscript  tradition.  Texts  and
helpful translations are given throughout, sometimes of material not readily available
elsewhere in translation. Brémond provides an apparatus criticus for each of her texts
further cementing the usefulness of this volume as ‘one-stop’ resource for specialists.
However, in the case of the MXG, a difficult and contested work from a textual point of
view, a more thorough account of the principles adopted in editing and selecting between
variants and conjectures would have been welcome. This is, unfortunately, relegated to
the endnotes and is ad hoc in nature. A sound and reliable text of the MXG remains a
(possibly infeasible) desideratum. 
4 The interpretative chapter on the MXG is a highlight. We are provided with a thorough
account  of  the  literature  and  fine  analyses  of  the  author’s  (whoever  this  might  be)
method and the work’s  structure.  Of particular  note  is  Brémond’s  handling of  those
arguments found in the MXG that do not appear in our verbatim fragments. Here we find
one of the most original claims made in the work, and it is worth looking at in detail. 
5 Brémond takes up the argument found in the MXG (974a12-14) suggesting that Melissus
deduced his predicate ‘homogeneous’ (ὅμοιον) from ‘one’ (ἕν). There the claim is that
being unlike (heterogeneous) entails plurality and thus whatever is one is alike in every
way. This is not found in the verbatim fragments, but the beginning of B7, listing the
attributes  of  what-is,  clearly  suggests  he  has  made  such  a  deduction  in  a  prior
demonstration. Standardly, the discussion in the MXG is assumed to represent what has
been lost from Melissus’ own words.
6 Here  Brémond  suggests  an  alternative  and  points  to  a  forthcoming  article  (Ancient
Philosophy, Volume I, 2019) defending her interpretation in detail. As this contribution has
appeared, I proceed from its conclusions. She focuses on the puzzle of the unity of B7,
which has received some attention, particularly from Friedrich Solmsen. Melissus claims
there  that  were  there  alteration,  what-is  could no longer  be  one (εἰ  γάρ  τι  τούτων
πάσχοι,  οὐκ  ἂν  ἔτι  ἓν  εἴη).  This  is  worrying  because  it  is  simply  not  obvious  that
alteration should be a  threat  to  the uniqueness  of  its  underlying subject.  Indeed,  as
Brémond suggests, the homogeneity targeted by Melissus seems more sensibly to be self-
identity through time rather than the spatial uniformity at any given moment usually
assumed. With this in mind, we should think that it is in B7 itself that such temporal
homogeneity is demonstrated, not in a previous, lost argument. The thought, then, is that
it is on the basis of eternity, not uniqueness, that homogeneity is demonstrated.
7 There is something to say in favour of such a thesis. Much of B7, for example, turns on
Melissus’  prohibition of generation and destruction suggesting the temporal line.  Yet
there are powerful reasons to reject any such reading and, ultimately, I don’t think this
argument can be accepted. B8, explicitly offered as a supplemental argument to what has
come before, seems to assume that plurality, understood as a spatially heterogeneous
world, has already been targeted. We might turn to Parmenides, as well. One of Melissus’
decisive  contributions  to  Eleaticism  is  his  explicit  connection  between  spatial  and
temporal infinity.  There is  every reason to think that he followed suit  in connecting
spatial and temporal homogeneity. This is what Melissus means when he says that what-
is is one (ἕν); we need not assume that it is ambiguous to claim that plurality is the shared
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contradictory of both unity and uniqueness. The richness, rather than ambiguity, of the
concept of the Eleatic ‘One’ is Melissus’ crowning achievement. We cannot simply dismiss
our text because it seems ‘strange’ and difficult to construe when we have no compelling
textual reason to do so.
8 Most challenging is Brémond suggestion that εἰ γάρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἓν εἴη
is  to be understood as a marginal  notation that has crept into our text.  Certainly,  a
strong, although not entirely persuasive, parallel argument has been raised by Jonathan
Barnes  for  excising  ὥστε  συμβαίνει  μήτε  ὁρᾶν  μήτε  τὰ  ὄντα  γινώσκειν  from  B8.
However,  that  case  turns  on  the  conspicuously  unusual  form and vocabulary  of  the
clause. Even so, Laks and Most are probably wise to keep the clause in their Loeb edition.
On the other hand, Brémond’s sentence is resolutely Melissan in both form (a conditional
statement with the optative) and vocabulary. It is also little more than handwaving to
claim that the first sentence of B7 (οὕτως οὖν ἀίδιόν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον
πᾶν) does not imply that homogeneity has already been demonstrated. I conclude that
this  line  of  interpretation does  violence  to  the  text  and must  be  rejected.  However,
Brémond does usefully remind us that more caution is needed than simply assuming that
the MXG faithfully reproduces Melissus’ argument. 
9 On the MXG itself,  Brémond rightly emphasises its Aristotelian influence and credibly
argues  that  the  author  is  himself  an  Aristotelian,  pushing  back  against  Mansfeld’s
suggestion  of  a  sceptical  influence  on  the  treatise.  The  discussion  of  De  sensu  3 in
reference to the argument against mixture I found to be suggestive, although it remains
unclear to me why Pseudo-Aristotle would adapt an argument specifically focused on
colour for the purposes of interpreting Melissus. The much more fertile ground of GC 1 10
seems a far more obvious source for the Aristotelian discussion of mixture. I mention
here  Mansfeld’s  recent  attempt  to  find something genuine  in  the  MXG discussion of
mixture,  where  he  marshals  Parmenides’  discussion  of  mixture  in  B16  as  support.
Intriguingly,  in that  fragment and in the MXG the mixtures envisioned seem equally
limited in scope by implying the separation of the components in the mixture. In any
case,  Brémond’s  scepticism is  probably  warranted,  and  one  might  hope  for  a  fuller
treatment along these lines of the MXG, as a whole, in future. 
10 One of the subtlest treatments, and I think one of its most important contributions, of the
book is the analysis of Melissus’ reception in Simplicius and Philoponus. As nearly all of
our verbatim quotations are found in the former, this area is of particular importance.
Brémond considers the possibility of a common source in Ammonius for the discussions
of both Neoplatonists, but significantly offers an intriguing comparison of where the two
differ.  She  concludes  that  Simplicius  offers  a  complete,  and  extremely  important,
rehabilitation of Melissus,  whereas Philoponus provides something less complete,  less
novel, and perhaps dependent on an unreliable source text. I found much of this chapter
extremely convincing, and the value of Simplicius’ commentary is rightly confirmed. 
11 The provision of more than 300 pages of texts and translations will, no doubt, make this
volume  a  fundamental  reference  point  and  guarantee  its  place  on  the  shelves  of
Presocratic specialists. Of course, the comprehensiveness of such an edition means that
some texts are less useful and more derivative than others. On the whole, the choice of
endnotes for where arguments on textual matters and points of translation are to be
found is less successful than it might have been. Sigla and information on the editions of
the texts used are unhelpfully given in an appendix rather than in the short introductions
offered before each section of the edition. This is a minor matter, of course, but the ease
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of use for such a reference volume is not inconsequential. A similar quibble might be
raised with the rather minimal indices, although an index locorum is provided. 
12 Taking stock: I am delighted to have Brémond’s volume on my desk. It is fluently written,
largely clear  in its  argumentation,  and its  conclusions are obviously flagged.  No one





Mathilde Brémond, Lectures de Mélissos. Édition, traduction et interprétation...
Philosophie antique , Comptes rendus
4
